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The Uncertain Future of  
Administrative Law
Jeremy Kessler & Charles Sabel
A volatile series of presidential transitions has only intensified the century-long con-
flict between progressive defenders and conservative critics of the administrative 
state. Yet neither side has adequately confronted the fact that the growth of uncer-
tainty and the corresponding spread of guidance–a kind of provisional “rule” that 
invites its own revision–mark a break in the development of the administrative 
state as significant as the rise of notice-and-comment rulemaking in the 1960s and 
1970s. Whereas rulemaking corrected social shortsightedness by enlisting science 
in the service of lawful administration, guidance acknowledges that both science 
and law are in need of continual correction. Administrative law has the resources 
to ensure that the provisionality of guidance does not lead to the abuses that con-
servatives fear. But to deploy those resources–and to carry through the reforms of 
administrative organization that are their natural complement–progressives must 
rethink their commitments to judicial deference to administrative authority and ad-
ministrative deference to presidential authority, commitments on which the progres-
sive defense of the administrative state currently depends.
In an interregnum, as the old order subsides and the new order struggles for definition and recognition, debate is often Janus-faced: now looking back-ward in an anguished attempt to save the receding world or put it in its best 
light; now looking forward to make the most of the possibilities for renewal that 
the emergent world affords. Such is the situation in American administrative 
law today. Under pressure for decades, the vulnerabilities of the administrative 
state were cast in harsh relief by the electoral victory of Donald Trump. This vic-
tory helped reveal and accelerate the erosion of public confidence in traditional 
models of growth and social mobility, the institutions of government, and the 
governing elite. The return of the White House to Democratic control will do lit-
tle to abate this erosion. Within the legal academy and the federal judiciary, the 
long-smoldering debate between progressives and libertarian-minded conserva-
tives over the New Deal legacy has burst into flames. Progressives defend current 
arrangements–and the internal operations of the administrative state in particu-
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the rule of law. Their opponents see an autonomous administrative state, largely 
playing by the rules that administrators have created for themselves, as a growing 
threat to the balance of judicial authority, legislative sovereignty, and presiden-
tial democracy on which constitutional freedoms depend. This debate can be so 
absorbing that its participants–losing sight of the mixture of achievements and 
shortcomings that make the actual administrative state a vexation, but perhaps a 
tolerable one, for the public–come to suspect that but for the machinations of the 
other side, there would be no real problem at all.
But alongside this first debate is a second, focused resolutely, yet without fan-
fare, on what administrative law can or should become. Its point of departure is 
the growing importance of uncertainty–the inability to anticipate future states 
of the world with enough confidence to assign them probabilities–to adminis-
trative decision-making. As is often the case in the early stages of epochal change, 
there is little attempt to give precise definition to the shift in progress, measure 
its extent, or explain its causes. Instead we are confronted with arresting descrip-
tions of new developments, counterintuitive to the world we thought we knew 
and inexplicable but for the postulated break with the past.1
For one leading commentator, Adrian Vermeule, the rise of uncertainty turns 
many substantive decisions into “coin flips,” foreclosing the reasoned ranking of 
alternatives or “first order” reason-giving that makes administrative decisions or-
derly and intelligible to reviewing courts. Outcomes will depend on “second or-
der” considerations having nothing to do with the law, such as the determination 
that, right now, any decision is better than none, or that one policy is more easily 
administrable than equally imperfect alternatives.2 Judges, recognizing this limit, 
should–and, more often than not, do–defer broadly to administrative discretion 
rather than futilely interrogate administrative actions that cannot be justified on 
conventional grounds. For Vermeule, a strong administrative state, freed by the 
judges themselves of all but the most minimal judicial check, is indispensable for 
realizing the popular will in otherwise uncertain times. That such a state does not 
conform to liberal democratic norms is no loss for Vermeule; that it invites domi-
nation by strong, popular leaders is if anything a gain.
For administrative law scholar Nicholas Parrillo, by contrast, the effect of un-
certainty on the administrative state has been the “oceanic” spread of guidance: 
a provisional form of regulation that tentatively advises private parties and public 
officials about how an agency intends to exercise its discretion or interpret its le-
gal authorities.3 In issuing guidance, an agency can give regulated entities an un-
derstanding of what compliance means right now, without committing itself to 
what will be required of regulated entities in the near future, should conditions 
change or new facts come to light. The public and private practitioners whose 
views inform Parrillo’s account regard guidance as “essential to their missions.” 
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without guidance”; according to one current Environmental Protection Agency 
official, guidance is “the bread and butter of agency practice.”4
But just as a firm, having achieved economies of scale for efficiency reasons, 
may use its size to compete unfairly, so Parrillo finds that the use of guidance as 
a legitimate response to uncertainty can open the way to abuse. To advance their 
own institutional interests or win the favor of particular constituents, administra-
tors may use guidance too flexibly, avoiding the procedural burdens that normally 
must be assumed to change policy, and frustrating the consistency required by the 
rule of law. Or administrators may use guidance too inflexibly, knowing that, once 
issued, guidance creates de facto legal obligations and permissions, and thus as a 
practical matter can regulate with the force of law while again evading the proce-
dures normally required to do so–and often judicial scrutiny as well. 
For Parrillo, judicial efforts to winnow the good uses of guidance from the bad 
have reached their limit. If guidance is to serve as an adaptive response to uncer-
tainty while limiting the risks of abuse, the administrative state should itself be 
reformed to further develop the institutional capacity for continuous but lawful 
adjustment to change and variety. Parrillo calls this capacity “principled flexi-
bility”: a method of decision-making in which requests for the revision of guid-
ance are easily made (reducing the risk of expedient compliance by habit) and 
exposed to appropriate discussion within the agency and its public (reducing the 
risks of clientelism). Principled flexibility implies an innovation in administra-
tion, already visible in some agencies, that connects front-line decision-makers 
with their superiors, on the one side, and regulatory parties and beneficiaries, on 
the other, to ensure an integration of rule-application (or enforcement), rule-mak-
ing, and rule-revision that conforms to the public interest and the rule of law, not 
simply to the self-interest of an agency as an organization or its lobbies.
Neither Vermeule’s nor Parrillo’s views provide anything approaching a 
comprehensive vision of a future administrative state, nor were they intended to 
do so. In important ways, they are in error. But they do clear a path to exploring 
how, in response to deep changes in the very circumstances of decision-making, 
administration has begun to purposefully adapt, and might well emerge from 
the interregnum better equipped to meet, effectively and legitimately, the de-
mands of a volatile world. That is the path that we follow and try to extend in 
this essay.
We begin with the premise that the growing reliance on guidance–a kind of 
provisional “rule” that invites its own revision or qualification–marks a break in 
the development of the administrative state on the order of the transition from 
regulation by case-by-case adjudication to regulation by notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s. Where rulemaking aimed to correct social 
shortsightedness by applying science in the service of lawful administration, 
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est when both science and law are recognized as themselves in need of continual 
correction. Guidance is the kind of law that uncertainty admits. 
The centrality of guidance to contemporary administration, in turn, calls into 
question politically progressive defenses of the administrative state. These de-
fenses ground the legality and legitimacy of administrative decision-making in 
the technical authority of professional administrators and the democratic author-
ity of their political superiors, two forms of authority that are harmonized and 
largely self-disciplined by internally generated hierarchical norms, which also 
serve as a shield against intrusive judicial review. Today, such deference to au-
thority and hierarchy seems incautious, even reckless. Even when understood as 
a strategic bargain, necessary to protect the autonomy of the administrative state 
from a judiciary suspected, often rightly, of congenital animosity to administra-
tion itself, the progressive defense resembles a pact with the devil. 
The emerging law of guidance, and the reality of uncertainty to which it re-
sponds, points toward a different, and more defensible, conception of the adminis-
trative state, one that is aware of its own fallibility, that routinely invites challenges 
to its technical and political authority, and that continually responds to these chal-
lenges with reasons that are legible to the courts and to the public at large.
This is an essay in reinterpretation, and exploratory reinterpretation at that. 
Few if any of the observations or references to empirical developments are origi-
nal to us. What is different is the perspective. Most commentators, and especial-
ly the ones from whom we have learned the most, strive to fit guidance within 
an overarching structure of mutually reinforcing doctrinal and organizational el-
ements: the traditional administrative state, put in its best light. When the fit is 
awkward, the commentators, as the excellent lawyers they are, explain the dis-
crepancy while preserving the structure. We see the same incongruities and ask 
instead if they might not prefigure a new frame and, if so, how elements of a re-
configured administrative state might fit into it. We go just far enough in that di-
rection, we hope, to suggest the plausibility of switching figure and ground.
T hough we want to show that the increase in uncertainty puts tectonic pressure on the administrative state, we begin by arguing that legal rea-soning, of the kind familiar to appellate courts, does not run out under 
uncertainty. In suggesting otherwise, Vermeule adopts the vantage point of the 
lone judge or administrator, deciding cases on the basis of records whose quality 
gradually degrades as new and puzzling circumstances arise, beyond the range of 
current understanding. When familiar sources of evidence become less reliable or 
irrelevant, the only way to decide is by tossing a coin or appealing to second-order 
reasons.
But uncertainty does not come to agencies in isolated instances or as a gath-
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and then a flood of indications that new approaches are needed. Often it is the 
agency itself that makes the limits of knowledge manifest and actionable, by pro-
posing to set a standard at or beyond the frontier of technology and, in doing so, 
calling attention to the uncertainty that must be overcome to make compliance 
eventually possible. Either in response to puzzling novelty or as part of a deliber-
ate effort to press beyond the known, the agency actively seeks the cooperation of 
all the actors in a position to learn a way through uncertainty. Such cooperation 
is likely to be forthcoming as regulators, regulated entities, and the beneficiaries 
of regulation, jointly ignorant of the risks they may face, share a vulnerability that 
can motivate joint action.5
There should be nothing surprising in such a reaction. We expect the rational 
actor, facing uncertainty, to inquire after further information the better to direct 
action. Nor should it be surprising, however, that organizing such inquiry is eas-
ier said than done. Ideally, when decisions are reversible and information is easi-
ly available, action and inquiry can proceed together, so that initial decisions are 
corrected without loss in light of later knowledge, even if, that too, remains provi-
sional. In fact, information is typically costly to acquire–not least because at the 
outset of inquiry it is not clear what needs to be known–and decisions can turn 
urgent and irreversible. Furthermore, inquiry can and from time to time does fail, 
though failure does not discredit the enterprise as a whole, any more than science 
as a whole is discredited by its reverses. In practice, what is called for in the face 
of uncertainty is “measured action,” in which each step is intended to inform the 
next.6 We can think of measured action as straddling the boundary between first- 
and second-order reasons, or, rather, devising by second-order considerations the 
means for enabling first-order choosing. Reducing administration to a choice be-
tween first- and second-order decision-making ignores the core of what adminis-
trators do.
A prerequisite of measured action in regulatory settings is the formation of 
regimes that signal when and where further inquiry is opportune or urgent, and 
when additional measures must be taken to further defer final decision or to act 
decisively.7 Regimes directed to this purpose arise, for example, when regulators: 
induce monitoring of ecosystems for the protection of particular species or the 
environment generally; mandate extensive reporting of the failures or side ef-
fects of products authorized for sale to detect latent hazards; or organize infor-
mation-pooling to set or reset (technology-forcing) limits on permissible levels of 
pollution as knowledge of what counts as dangerous exposure to the pollutant, the 
technologies of pollution control, and the costs of the latter change rapidly and 
unpredictably.8 Often resource constraints hamper formation of these regimes; 
sometimes their operation is frustrated by raw conflicts of interest or the very ri-
gidities of administrative law that we will discuss in relation to guidance.9 In the 
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NGOs, property owners, other public bodies–to learn what can be known; 
together they find a way through uncertainty that none could have found alone.
Are the reasons given to explain and justify the choice of a particular variant 
of this kind of rulemaking process, or to evaluate its performance with regard to 
a given outcome, unintelligible to lawyers generally, and especially to courts? It is 
hard to see why. Evaluation of first-order reason-giving will focus on the validity 
of the process by which reasons are produced, because it is easier for outsiders to 
judge the suitability of the decision-making process than the substance of an ar-
cane decision. Such outsiders can be expected to ask: Has there been an effort to 
canvas all the available evidence? Have competing views been considered and, as 
needed, reconsidered? Were channels left open for the easy registration of dis-
sent? Evaluation of the suitability of an information-gathering regime under un-
certainty will focus on process in the same way.
In administrative law, this kind of interrogation of the reasoned quality of 
decision-making has since the 1970s been associated with “hard-look” judicial re-
view or, more helpfully, process review, to distinguish it from judicial review of 
agency conformity to required procedures, or of the overall adequacy of some reg-
ulatory output.10 As its name suggests, hard-look review requires an agency to as-
sure that it has given searching consideration to relevant alternatives. From the 
first, this check on the conformity of the chain of administrative decision-making 
to a minimum standard of rationality has been understood to include the agency’s 
response to uncertainty. Perhaps the best statement of the requirements of process 
review, the D.C. Circuit’s 1974 opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. 
Hodgson, held that when an administrator is “obliged to make policy judgments 
where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, 
he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.”11
Courts are thus equipped to interrogate agency management of monitoring re-
gimes. Indeed, many of the cases that courts hear in which first-order reasons are 
insufficient, leaving the agency to decide by coin toss or appeal to second-order 
reasons, arise from the failure of a poorly designed or carelessly operated infor-
mation-gathering system, with the judge called on to evaluate the legal and prac-
tical merits of competing remedies. The question before the court (including in 
many of the cases Vermeule cites to illustrate his view of reason-giving under un-
certainty) is not only what the agency should do given that it does not have the 
information needed to decide, but rather how it got into this situation in the first 
place, and what to do about that.12 We are not suggesting that lawyers or courts, 
by asking such questions, should take the lead in designing the agency process of 
decision-making under uncertainty any more than they currently do. Our point is 
only that there is nothing alien to the legal mind in judging the sufficiency of an 
agency process against criteria no more or less vague than those used to evaluate 
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As public and private administrators come to appreciate that they are working under conditions of real uncertainty, they will seek whenever possible to make provisional decisions, learn quickly from them, and re-
vise accordingly. They will use guidance, a form of administrative action defined 
by its provisionality. Guidance is an extraordinarily heterogeneous category, com-
prising all those written documents that administrators issue to inform their own 
staff and the public at large about how they currently understand and intend to 
enforce their legal authorities, whether derived from congressional statute or 
prior administrative regulation. As Parrillo notes, guidance comes in countless 
forms–“advisories, circulars, bulletins, memos, interpretive letters, enforcement 
manuals, fact sheets, FAQs, highlights, you name it”–and is nowhere systemati-
cally collected. As a rough estimate, the number of pages of guidance that agen-
cies produce “dwarf[s] that of actual regulations by a factor of twenty, forty, or 
even two hundred.”13
Formally, the signal feature of guidance is its provisionality. Agency rules are 
generally issued and amended by means of a costly and time-consuming process, 
called “notice-and-comment” or “legislative” rulemaking, in which the agency 
must elaborately explain its purposes, expose its evidence-gathering and delibera-
tion to public scrutiny, and explain its reactions to criticism. Guidance, in contrast, 
can be issued and amended quickly, with little if any formal process.14 Because of 
this informality, guidance lacks “the force of law” and thus “the power to bind” 
private parties characteristic of agency rules. Guidance is, formally, “only a sug-
gestion–a mere tentative announcement of the agency’s current thinking about 
what to do in individual adjudicatory or enforcement proceedings, not something 
the agency will follow in an automatic, ironclad manner as it would a legislative 
rule.”15 As such, guidance not only permits but demands flexibility: “If a partic-
ular individual or firm wants to do something (or wants the agency to do some-
thing) that is different than what the guidance suggests, the agency is supposed to 
give fair consideration to that alternative approach.”16 Similarly, while an agency 
may choose to depart from its guidance without formal process, it should in prin-
ciple give a reasoned explanation for such departures.17 Understood in this way, 
guidance is a tool for measured action. 
Yet government-by-guidance has provoked significant legal controversy, for 
at least three related reasons.18 First, as notice-and-comment rulemaking became 
accepted as the paradigmatic mode of administrative rulemaking, the less pro-
cedurally onerous issuance of guidance began to strike some scholars, litigants, 
and judges as a potential cheat. As Justice Elena Kagan put it during an oral argu-
ment in 2015, this is the recurrent concern that “agencies more and more are us-
ing interpretive rules and are using guidance documents to make law and that . . . 
it is essentially an end run around the notice and comment provisions.”19 A sec-
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them difficult to challenge in court, agencies can use guidance to evade not only 
the pre-issuance notice-and-comment process but also post-issuance judicial re-
view as well.20 A final concern relates to the proliferation of doctrinal deference to 
agencies’ interpretation of their statutory mandates and prior regulations. Critics 
warn that such deference perversely shelters agency interpretations announced 
in guidance documents from judicial scrutiny, even though they do not reflect the 
deliberation and evidence-gathering required by the notice-and-comment pro-
cess or by formal agency adjudication.21
Underlying these technical legal objections are deeper normative concerns 
about the relationship of regulation as “current thinking” to conventional forms 
of legal authority–legislative, executive, and judicial–that help to explain why 
guidance continues to bedevil American courts and legal commentators. Guid-
ance, unlike notice-and-comment rules, cannot be seen as analogous to and di-
rectly descended from legislation as a natural outgrowth of the constitution-
al order. But neither does guidance have the finality that marks the culmination 
of lawful executive or judicial action. Unlike prosecutorial indictments and ad-
ministrative enforcement actions, it does not purport to represent the executive 
branch’s determination that a particular private party has violated the law; unlike 
administrative orders and judicial decisions, it is not an assessment of the guilt or 
liability of an accused party. Guidance is always ripening into a conclusive deci-
sion, but it is never ripe; for this reason, unlike administrative rules and orders, it 
is not reviewable by the courts as a matter of course.
In the paradigmatic forms of legal decision, the ultimate decision-maker is the 
agent of a constitutional principal–the legislature, the executive, the judiciary– 
or one of the constitutional principals themselves. Each of the latter is in turn ul-
timately the agent of the popular sovereign. In general, a principal sets the frame-
work within which decisions are made and reviews an agent’s actions for con-
formity to its intent. With guidance, and under uncertainty generally, this prin-
cipal-agent relation breaks down. The framework for decision-making becomes 
indistinct as the field of possible actions and the criteria for evaluating them be-
come less and less determinate, especially as seen, by the principal, from afar. The 
diligent administrative “agent,” in dialogue with external actors (regulated par-
ties and regulatory beneficiaries) as much as or more than with internal superiors, 
is as likely to make decisions presuming new frameworks as to apply old ones. 
Accordingly, the same circumstances that make guidance inherently provisional 
make it inherently refractory to the forms of control that traditionally confer legal 
validity and democratic legitimacy. To the extent that guidance regimes increas-
ingly reflect ongoing collaboration among a hierarchically diverse group of public 
and private actors, the content and legal effect of guidance at any given moment 
will have an increasingly attenuated (or at least increasingly uncertain) relation-
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scholastic or opportunistic debates about the legality and legitimacy of guidance 
can be, they articulate a very real problem: whether liberal democratic societ-
ies are capable of managing uncertainty without reinterpreting what it means to 
make law, and the values that underpin lawmaking, when law itself must often be 
provisional. 
Well-established groups of practitioners in and around the agencies, antici-
pating our own approach, have over the years proposed working solutions to this 
problem, devising new standards by which guidance regimes can be developed 
with principled flexibility in mind, while remaining legible to courts and the pub-
lic at large. The practitioners’ understandings are reflected in a variety of “institu-
tional pronouncements”–by the American Bar Association, the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, and guidance about guidance produced by the 
agencies themselves–which describe the sorts of reasons that agencies should 
be prepared to give to regulated parties, regulatory beneficiaries, and the courts 
whenever they depart from or adhere to a practice or norm established by prior 
guidance documents.22 Like the commentators who refer approvingly to their 
views, the practitioners have no broad program of reform. But it is worth noting 
that, since the 1990s, successive cohorts have been at the forefront of such stan-
dard-setting, not resistant to it–as conservative fears about the widespread abuse 
of guidance might lead one to conclude.
Many liberal and left-leaning scholars, meanwhile, are so intent on defending 
the administrative state–conceived along midcentury lines–from conservative 
rollback that they are insufficiently attentive to the accumulating innovations in 
practice that might provide resources for responding to real deficiencies in the le-
gality and legitimacy of administrative decision-making. Preoccupied with pres-
ervation, the progressive defense of the administrative state has given rise to an 
organizational and doctrinal synthesis of the governance mechanisms–agency 
expertise, presidential oversight, judicial deference–that, taken together, argu-
ably legitimate in a novel and compelling way the traditional, and implicitly un-
changing, forms of administrative governance. Below, we present this interpreta-
tion of administrative law and indicate its shortcomings as a framework for mea-
sured action under uncertainty. 
T he progressive synthesis is our name for a constellation of arguments that ground administrative legality and legitimacy in external political con-trol–presidential control in particular–and internal professionalism. 
This synthesis is the product of historical evolution, in which elements with dif-
ferent origins co-evolve, in the manner of the components of what would become 
the human eye, as they are enlisted into the service of a common function. Like 
all evolutionary stories, it has a “just so” aspect. We present it as a fully integrated 
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Here, in outline, are the essentials: Externally, or at the outer boundary of the 
administrative state, Congress delegates authority to administrative agencies and 
the president directs how agencies wield it. Internally, this authority triggers pro-
cesses of deliberation and decision conforming to the professional habits and 
norms of the scientific and legal experts who work within individual adminis-
trative agencies and supervisory institutions, such as the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). Thanks to this layer of professional mediation, the ultimate 
expression of congressionally delegated and presidentially directed authority– 
administrative decisions–can be expected, most of the time, to be both scientif-
ically rational and legally valid. Energetic and continuing presidential direction, 
meanwhile, ensures that administration is not frustrated by the bureaucratic tor-
por and rivalry common to large organizations, and that decisions have the nec-
essary democratic pedigree, even when they are far removed, in time and effect, 
from what Congress might have contemplated when first delegating authority to 
a particular agency.24 
The synthesis of presidentialism and professionalism is effected by and em-
bodied in internal administrative law: a body of norms, growing out of the prac-
tice of administration itself, that harmonizes the demands of political will, legal 
regularity, and scientific rationality. In the progressive account, internal adminis-
trative law is hierarchical: within agencies, it subordinates lower-level decision- 
making to higher-level review, with the head of the agency as the ultimate author-
ity; within the executive branch, it subordinates agencies to the direction of the 
president. Institutionally, the routine operation of these nested hierarchies is po-
liced by super- or meta-agencies–such as the OMB and, within it, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs–housed within the Executive Office of the 
President.25
Because presidentialism and professionalism continually imbue administra-
tive decisions with democratic legitimacy, legal validity, and scientific rational-
ity, courts lose their centrality as the guardians of the constitutional conformity 
of the administrative state. Partisans of the progressive synthesis rarely disclaim 
the virtues of judicial review altogether, but they focus on its vices: the tendency 
of courts to subordinate the rationality of the administrative process to their own 
professional and political preferences. These limits warrant a general policy of ju-
dicial deference to administrative decision-making. More often than not, courts 
should avoid reviewing administrative decisions at all; when review is called for, 
courts should defer to administrators’ expert views of the meaning of the laws 
their decisions implement, the procedures that were necessary to get the job done, 
and the evidentiary and policy rationales for deciding one way or another.
Whatever its merits as a response to anti-administrative attacks, the progres-
sive synthesis is deficient in important ways. First, it is conceptually incomplete, if 
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litical directive and decision-making by expertise proceed by different methods. 
They may reach the same or compatible solutions, but they may not. The synthe-
sis provides no process or principles for systematically reconciling them. Instead, 
following the promptings of doctrine, it assumes that both can be exchanged into 
the common currency of hierarchy and made interchangeable. But as the count-
less conflicts between the previous administration and the professional staffs of 
the agencies attest, the reality is otherwise. In fact, courts are routinely called on 
to decide whether, in a particular case, deference is owed to hierarchical authority 
of one kind or another, political or professional. Familiar tensions are recast, not 
overcome.26
These tensions point to a second and politically salient defect of the synthesis: 
its limited resources for responding to presidential overreach. For the progressive 
synthesis, the chief threat to constitutional democracy continues to be, as it has 
been since the New Deal, a conservative judiciary and, more generally, the frus-
tration of decisive and synoptic leadership, whatever its origin. Expansive defense 
of doctrines of judicial deference to administrative hierarchy responds to the first 
danger, while defense of the authority of the Executive Office of the President to 
supervise, coordinate, and direct decision-making across the administrative state 
responds to the second. But when the corrective of an empowered White House 
itself becomes a threat–perhaps the threat–to democratic, lawful, and effective 
administration, these responses become worse than useless. 
A third deficiency goes to the inadequacy of the progressive synthesis as a re-
sponse to uncertainty. The synthesis validates authority in its various forms while 
seeking to coordinate their exercise. Uncertainty calls authority in all its forms 
into question. It does not, to be sure, simply devalue expertise or political leader-
ship. But it emphasizes the role of the expert and the political leader as organizers 
of open-ended inquiry, rather than as repositories of tried-and-true solutions that 
must merely be adapted to new contexts.
I f not by the progressive synthesis, how then can administrative law help make professional expertise and political control usefully commensurate, in ways that improve the capacity of the administrative state to respond to uncertain-
ty, conform it to minimal liberal democratic norms, and limit the dangers of pres-
idential overreach? We offer a provisional answer to this question in the form of 
an alternative doctrinal program and a reminder of the fundamental need for or-
ganizational reform. 
Our programmatic alternative treats uncertainty not simply as a challenge to 
be met, but as a guide. Uncertainty is the great leveler. In revealing the limits of 
current knowledge, it limits the claims of authority–all forms of secular authori-
ty at least–and presses authorities of all sorts into a more or less open inquiry that 
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Such inquiry, moreover, regularly brings to light the interdependence of dispa-
rate types of authority, as political action is found to have technical prerequisites 
and vice versa. Forms of administrative law and organization that improve the 
quality of reason-giving and exchange between the political and technical author-
ities, and enable courts and the public to better judge these authorities’ respective 
claims, make the administrative state more effective in responding to uncertainty 
and more likely to respect core liberal democratic norms in doing so. 
The alternative program emphasizes that judicial review, despite its suscepti-
bility to ideological capture and prolonged history of anti-administrativism, re-
mains an indispensable tool for resolving conflicts between presidentialism and 
professionalism, sociopolitical and sociotechnical reason-giving.27 Current doc-
trine invites litigants and judges to attack guidance as practically binding regula-
tions that should have gone through the notice-and-comment process. We agree 
with the progressive view that this doctrine should be reformed, not least to avoid 
formalistic maneuvering on all sides that leaves administrative action less suscep-
tible to post-issuance input, learning, and revision on the fly. But we part company 
with the progressive synthesis when it comes to the availability and scope of judi-
cial review of guidance.
The traditional argument against the reviewability of guidance begins in pru-
dence but ends in formalism: guidance is said to lack the finality and ripeness nec-
essary for effective and lawful judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), the Constitution, and the common law. The objection to this argument 
is that guidance is so well-suited to regulating in an uncertain world precisely be-
cause it encourages participants in the administrative process to act now: to exper-
iment with new technologies and methods of organization, to share information, 
and to give reasons why other participants should act differently in light of these 
experiments and information exchanges. If a proposed guidance regime is legally 
or practically flawed, and that flaw is presently known, it should be presently ad-
dressed. Otherwise, the resulting regime risks discouraging the exploration and 
experimentation it is meant to foster.28 
With respect to the scope of judicial review, the progressive synthesis endors-
es and would extend a body of doctrine that focuses on whether guidance doc-
uments are permissible interpretations of preexisting statutory and regulato-
ry provisions. Instead of asking how well-considered, responsive to objections, 
and consistent with prior explanations agency reason-giving is, these doctrines 
encourage judges to determine only whether administrators are offering mini-
mally reasonable interpretations of the statutory and regulatory provisions that 
authorize them to regulate at all.29 In recent years, progressives have argued that 
this type of reasonable-interpretation inquiry should, in most circumstances, be 
as narrow and formalistic as possible; a semantically plausible interpretation–an 








niversity user on 29 Septem
ber 2021
200 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
The Uncertain Future of Administrative Law
well limit the extent to which judges interpose their own views for those of ad-
ministrators, but it does so at the price of obscuring and thus tolerating or even 
encouraging incompetent or self-serving decision-making.
Our alternative program would refocus courts and agencies on what some 
commentators have called process review: review of the chain of reasoning that has 
led an agency to adopt and maintain a particular guidance regime.30 Such review 
asks whether the agency’s decisions in the form of guidance are well-considered, 
responsive to objections, and consistent with prior explanations of agency behav-
ior and previously established regulatory presumptions. When an agency departs 
from prior explanations or presumptions, or chooses to maintain them despite 
objections, process review asks whether the agency has acknowledged its depar-
tures (or refusals to change course) and whether it has given plausible reasons for 
its choices. So described, process review is distinct both from procedural review, 
which asks whether a guidance document is so impactful that it should have been 
issued by more onerous procedures (such as notice-and-comment rulemaking), 
and from outcome review, which asks whether a guidance document is substan-
tively reasonable in light of the evidence the agency had at its disposal. The defer-
ential review of an agency’s interpretive choices preferred by progressives is one 
kind of outcome review, while the suspicion that agencies use guidance to avoid 
notice-and-comment rulemaking frequently leads conservatives and more clas-
sical liberals to advocate an exacting kind of procedural review.31 Process review 
steers clear of these extremes and, more importantly, encourages agencies to ac-
knowledge uncertainty and manage it in a reasonable manner.32 
Happily, there are resources in current law that permit judicial review of agen-
cy action under uncertainty to take the form of process review and, in doing so, 
improve the quality of administrative reason-giving. One such resource is hard-
look arbitrary and capricious review, the standard that judges apply when review-
ing an agency’s exercise of its policy judgment rather than its interpretive acumen. 
While hard-look review can resemble either process or outcome review, depend-
ing on the kinds of questions that a court asks when assessing an agency’s policy 
judgment, the canonical hard-look case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of 
the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (1983), nicely exemplifies 
the sort of process inquiry we favor. 
Another doctrinal resource that already encourages process review is the Skid-
more framework.33 Skidmore instructs judges to give weight to an agency’s legal 
interpretation according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”34 Subsequent doctrinal de-
velopments significantly narrowed the reach of Skidmore in favor of more hierar-
chically minded, formalistic, and deferential standards, such as Chevron (which 
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uous statutory mandates) and Auer (which directs judges to accept facially rea-
sonable interpretations of an agency’s own ambiguous regulations). These latter 
standards are today most vociferously defended by progressives. Recently, how-
ever, judges and scholars from across the political spectrum have begun to explore 
the possibilities of Skidmore anew.35
In the 2018 Kisor decision, Justice Elena Kagan, whose defense of Clintonian 
presidential administration has become a keystone of progressive thinking, wrote 
an opinion narrowing the scope of Auer deference, much to the disappointment 
of progressive scholars. Kagan’s opinion directed lower court judges to ask a set 
of threshold questions before applying Auer when reviewing agency interpreta-
tions of their prior regulations. These threshold questions, somewhat analogous 
to ones that already confine the application of Chevron in statutory interpretation, 
effectively move away from the formalism of Auer and back toward the more ho-
listic Skidmore endeavor of calibrating the degree of deference to the persuasive 
quality of agency decision-making. 
Our alternative program would accelerate this movement, urging, for example, 
that guidance documents always be evaluated under Skidmore, whether they are 
construed as interpreting an agency’s prior regulations or its statutory mandates. 
Going further, the alternative program would extend Skidmore to notice-and-com-
ment rules, displacing the Chevron framework altogether and thus limiting agency 
incentives to regulate in a more inflexible manner when guidance would do. 
Of course, the pursuit of Chevron deference is not the primary reason that agen-
cies regulate by notice-and-comment rulemaking. Statutory requirements and ju-
dicial expectations, as well as genuine desire for public input, all drive agencies to-
ward the notice-and-comment process, at least some of the time. To the extent that 
many so-called statutory requirements are themselves products of judicial interpre-
tation (whether of the APA, an agency’s organic statute, or both), this is another area 
where our alternative program would recommend greater, rather than less, judicial 
deference. Unless an agency’s organic statute explicitly requires notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking, judges should permit the agency to proceed by guidance.36
Finally, the alternative program would recommend that hard-look review and 
the Skidmore inquiry, both understood as process rather than outcome tests, be 
used more or less interchangeably. In this way, judicial review of the agency’s rea-
soning process would converge on a single standard in nearly all cases, mitigating 
the incentives agencies have to choose one form of rulemaking (more rather than 
less formal) or reason-giving (interpretive rather than policy-based) over another 
in order to garner greater judicial deference.37 
Together these recommendations recast judicial review, at least with respect 
to guidance and thus action under uncertainty, as asking not whether agency deci-
sions possess a sufficiently hierarchical pedigree to merit deference, but whether 
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Our alternative program is not, however, simply a call to recenter the courts. 
We recognize that internal administrative law and organizational reform are vital 
complements to process review as a means of improving agency reason-giving. 
The progressive synthesis, however, is drawn to a peculiarly hierarchical concep-
tion of internal administrative law. By embedding administration in hierarchy, 
the synthesis seeks to reconcile presidentialism and professionalism and, in doing 
so, justify a more limited role for the courts. But under uncertainty, this approach 
imputes a burden of certitude on technical and political authorities that neither 
can bear.
Administrative law scholar Jerry Mashaw’s historical reconstruction of inter-
nal administrative law, informed and in some measure inspired by his investiga-
tions of decision-making in federal agencies around 1980, suggests an alternative 
interpretation, one that is less hierarchical and more capable of managing uncer-
tainty.38 Mashaw understands internal administrative law as a system of quality 
control by which an agency corrects flaws in its process of decision-making to bet-
ter serve its public purpose, where that purpose notably requires the process itself 
to be perceived as fair. Internal administrative law as quality control is always rel-
ative to the kind of decisions whose quality is in question. When, as was the case 
when Mashaw did his empirical research, the public interest was served by the 
hierarchical application of fixed rules to decide the validity of individual claims, 
internal administrative law aimed to improve the quality of the information avail-
able to the hierarchy and the reliability of its treatment of that information. But 
when, as is increasingly the case, the public interest under uncertainty is served 
by full and fair ventilation of reasons for action in changing contexts that resist 
hierarchical control, internal administrative law turns to improving the quality 
of those processes. Thus, one of the most thorough recent case studies of internal 
administrative law documents such a shift, showing how the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency replaced an unworkable standard-setting procedure–which ad-
vanced from regulatory goal-setting to the choice of regulatory means in the fa-
miliar hierarchical or principal-agent sequence–with a nonhierarchical process 
that invites criticism of emergent decisions at each stage of their development.39 
Enlarged to include, as it plainly does, nonhierarchical routines, internal ad-
ministrative law can indeed be an instrument for harmonizing different forms of 
expertise. But like judicial review of process, it does so by requiring the clarifica-
tion of differences, not by assuming that different ways of knowing and deciding 
can be ranked according to the degree they are authoritative.
Both process review and internal administrative law, properly understood, can 
improve the incentives for sound reason-giving. But neither separately nor togeth-
er can they substitute for the demanding organizational reform of agencies need-
ed to make principled flexibility a practical routine. For Parrillo, this rewiring of 
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guidance documents entails interventions that are essentially structural and man-
agerial.”40 His research reminds us again and again of the betwixt-and-between 
character of our agencies, with front-line departments rigidly enforcing rules and 
a separate, superior department making and revising them, even as questions of 
private-sector “compliance” increasingly implicate questions about the advis-
ability of rule changes. Often, we expect, reorganization aimed at overcoming 
these barriers to the fluid internal collaboration required for principled flexibil-
ity will trigger corresponding changes in internal administrative law; sometimes 
revisions of internal law will trigger further institutional reform. In either case, 
change requires both reformed practices and new legal norms validating them. 
In the end, going beyond the progressive synthesis means allowing adminis-
trative innovation in the face of uncertainty to run its course. Like the progressive 
defense of the administrative state, our alternative program depends on adminis-
trators acting in good faith, most of the time. But the alternative program breaks 
with the progressives’ reliance on the formalism of principal-agent relationships 
and hierarchically ordered authorities to legitimate administrative action.41 That 
reliance is out of character, given progressivism’s origins in a revolt against for-
malism. But above all, it is self-defeating. Against the conservatives’ formalistic 
objections to administrative governance, progressives have taken refuge in a for-
malism of their own, one that fetters administration with an outmoded model of 
decision-making too self-confident for an uncertain world.
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